Firms can increase profitability by appropriately motivating managers. We investigate drivers of managerial motivation, and propose how firms can use performance-pay to alter motivational patterns. We focus on the agent's optimal effort decision in trading off compensation utility with effort cost in a static and dynamic setting. Surprisingly, we find that lower risk aversion or increased pay are not necessarily motivating factors, and identify the relevant effort drivers underlying the agent's utility and compensation plan. We characterize properties of agents' preferences for output lotteries (risk aversion, aggressiveness, prudence) that trigger systematic motivational patterns with respect to a variety of factors, such as agent's productivity and past performance, time to evaluation, firm's capabilities and market factors. Our insights are robust, holding under very general modeling assumptions on preferences, rewards and the stochastic effort-output function.
Introduction
According to a new Hewitt global study, 2006 will mark an "increased activity in the area of variable pay, as companies rely more on bonuses as a primary means of attracting, motivating and retaining key talent".
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For example, the Bank of America offers performance-based contracts to all employees, because "incentive pay makes people work harder", just as Alpharma Inc. puts more money into incentive compensation because they "have seen a connection between company performance and employee incentive," the Wall Street Journal reports.
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Bonus pay is typically tied to corporate profitability, either in an egalitarian structure, or a "meritocracy" that differentiates employees based on their quarterly or annual performance. According to Hewitt, "companies are putting more focus on the notion of performance, and they're willing to spend [...] more on bonus pay when the results justify it". To determine performance, firms look at a wide array of measures, ranging from objective sales targets, to customer satisfaction ratings, all the way to subjective assessment of interpersonal effectiveness. Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-00924-2005 not convexify the agent's value function). This condition is also necessary to induce motivation from a diverse workforce, when performance, also referred to as output, is unpredictable by the firm.
Factors that influence output have an indirect impact on effort; these include the agent's productivity and past performance, the firm's capabilities, as well as market factors, such as price or risk. In this context, we investigate which properties of agent's (reward-induced) preferences for output (see Definition 1) are relevant triggers of motivational patterns. We find that agents with aggressive preferences for output are motivated by their own and the firm's productivity, contrary to conservative ones. Agents with risk seeking preferences for output expend more effort in bigger markets, or when prices are lower (the opposite holds in the risk averse case). An increase in market risk motivates agents with prudent output preferences, and demotivates imprudent ones (see Definition 3). We also show that the corresponding trigger properties of agent's preferences (risk seeking, aggressive, prudent) are also necessary to elicit a robust motivational pattern. Finally, we provide conditions on the compensation plan to induce such preferences for output.
The last part of the paper investigates how past performance and evaluation horizon affect the agent's effort level in a dynamic setting, where variable compensation is delivered based on cumulated output at the end of a multi-period horizon (year, quarter). We identify the agent's induced risk aversion for output as the trigger property of consistent effort behavior. Specifically, managers with risk averse output preferences (e.g. linear compensation plans) are unmotivated by past successes (i.e. expend less effort the better their achievements). Longer evaluation horizons are not motivating for such agents, who tend to procrastinate at the beginning of the evaluation period and undertake more effort closer to bonus time. Interestingly, these patterns can be reversed by changing the reward function in a way that induces risk seeking preferences for output.
Literature Review and Positioning. Our work is related to three main streams of literature in marketing (salesforce compensation), decision sciences (economic agent models), and finance (executive compensation). A seminal paper in the salesforce compensation literature is Basu, Lal, Srinivasan and Staelin (1985) , who characterize the optimal contract in a static principal-agent setting, with power utility and Gamma/Binomial sales. They provide comparative statics with respect to market uncertainty, salesforce effectiveness and production cost under linear contracts.
A wide range of variations and extensions have been subsequently proposed, but few are related to our work.
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Lal and Srinivasan (1993) extend Basu et al. (1985) to a dynamic setting; their dynamic 5 problem is elegantly reduced to a static one due to the exponential utility assumption. Dynamics are also considered by Tapiero and Farley (1975) , in a multi-product deterministic setting, and Dearden and Lilien (1990) , in a two-period production learning model. Reviews on salesforce compensation are due to Coughlan and Sen (1989) and Coughlan (1993) . The insights from these parametric principal-agent models are contrasted with the robust, non-parametric results derived from our analysis of the agent's problem.
In the decision analysis literature, 6 a stream of work related to ours considers the problem of an agent who controls a risky distribution of losses by exerting effort. Dionne and Eeckhoudt (1985) show that the agent's risk aversion has an ambiguous effect on effort, under a Binomial loss model. Jullien, Salanié and Salanié (1999) provide sufficient conditions on the risk distribution for higher risk aversion to induce higher effort. Eeckhoudt and Gollier (2005) determine prudence as the key determinant of the agent's optimal effort behavior, in line with our results in Section 5. We provide a general, in depth analysis of how agent's preferences affect effort in Section 3.
Besides effort, another important aspect of agent's output is risk. Optimal response to risk, under various compensation schemes, is investigated from an agent's perspective by Gaba and Kalra (1999) and Gaba, Tsetlin and Winkler (2004) , and, in a principal-agent model, by Godes (2004) . The financial literature has extensively investigated the influence of nonlinear contracts (typically convex options) on the agent's risk taking behavior. In particular, Ross (2004) focuses on the agent's problem to derive conditions on utility and reward plans to induce more or less risk averse behavior.
Structure and Framing. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The main static model is presented in Section 2. Section 3 investigates the impact of agent's preferences on effort. The motivational impact of pay-structures is the subject of Section 4. Section 5 investigates comparative statics with respect to factors affecting output, including the agent's and the firm's productivity, and market factors. Section 6 extends the problem to a dynamic setting and obtains insights with respect to the agent's past performance and time to evaluation. Section 7 concludes the paper.
Our model and results are applicable in contexts where the agent is subject to any form of performance-pay, and effort is a strategic decision affecting the agent's performance, or output. For simplicity, however, we focus the exposition of the paper on sales as the sole pragmatic measure of the agent's output; the effort-output function refers to the sales response. 
The Agent's Static Problem
This section sets up the static model, our main assumptions and basic notation. The agent's preferences are captured by a separable bi-criteria utility for wealth w ∈ R and effort x ∈ [0, 1]:
U represents the agent's utility for wealth, assumed increasing and concave (i.e. risk averse).
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The disutility, or cost of effort C is positive, increasing and convex, with C(0) = 0 and C(1) = ∞. Such a separable model is most common in the salesforce literature (see e.g. Basu et al. 1985, Lal and Staelin 1986) . The agent's effort level decision x controls a random output, also referred to as performance, or sales function S(x) = s(x, Y). The random variable Y captures exogenous factors (such as market forces) which affect output, but are not under the agent's control. Throughout the paper we denote random variables in bold. The riskless sales response function s(x, y) is assumed to be positive, increasing and concave in x. Concavity captures the diminishing marginal impact of effort on output. Monotonicity implies that the random sales response S(x) is increasing in effort, in the sense of first order stochastic dominance, i.e. higher levels of effort increase the probability of output above any given level. Relevant special cases include additively separable models S(x) = f (x) + Y, with f increasing, or multiplicative models S(x) = xY, where Y is a positive random variable. In our model, output can refer to either unit or dollar sales, depending on what the agent's compensation is structured around.
The compensation plan, r, also referred to as contract or reward, typically consists of a fixed salary F and a variable, sales dependent component v: r(s) = F +v(s), with v(0) = 0. 7 This can be interpreted as the percentage of effort devoted to the sales activity. Alternatively, and at no loss of generality, x could be defined in absolute terms over [0, ∞).
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Formally, the agent's static problem is modeled as:
(1)
Let R(x) denote the expected return from effort, i.e. R(
, the objective value in (1). We denote the optimal effort level x * = argmax x W (x), where without loss of generality the operator argmax refers to the largest maximizer (i.e. among equally appealing alternatives, the agent chooses the maximum effort one).
A factor λ is said to be motivating (demotivating) if the agent's optimal effort x * (λ) is increasing (decreasing) in λ. A given control parameter λ is motivating, whenever the agent's marginal return from effort R x (x, λ) is increasing in λ (partial derivatives are denoted by corresponding subscripts).
This marginal return effect is the key driver of motivational patterns. The next result follows from This condition states that compensation should not be steeper than output itself, which is practically not very restrictive. In particular, under a salary plus commission contract, this means that commission is not to exceed product margin, a necessary condition for profitable compensation.
Remark 1 identifies a simple design condition that aligns managerial effort and firm profits.
In particular, under such contracts, all our comparative statics for effort translate into analogous results with respect to firm profits. The condition, however, is not necessary (hence not assumed)
for the rest of the results in this paper.
Impact of Agent's Preferences on Motivation
In this section, we investigate the impact of the agent's preferences on effort. In an agency framework, Lal and Srinivasan (1993) show that the agent's optimal effort decreases in the degree of risk aversion, for an exponential utility model with linear contracts and normally distributed sales.
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We first confirm these results in the context of the agent's problem, under exponential and power utility models with general contract and sales functions. However, we show that the insights are non-robust, relying essentially on the parametric form of the utility function, and in particular on the independence of risk aversion and wealth. With general utility functions, we show that more risk averse agents do not necessarily work less (in fact, the opposite can be true), and we determine the appropriate property of the agent's preferences that acts as a systematic motivational driver.
We first remind some key concepts of risk aversion (see Pratt, 1964 and Arrow, 1965 ). An agent with utility U is more risk averse than an agent with utility u if U = g • u for a certain 9 concave function g. An agent exhibits increasing absolute risk aversion (IARA) if he is more risk averse at higher wealth levels, i.e. if for any δ ≥ 0, there exists a concave transformation g δ such that U (w + δ) = g δ (U (w)). If U is twice differentiable, this amounts to the absolute risk
being increasing. Decreasing/constant absolute risk aversion (DARA/CARA) are defined similarly. Relative risk aversion is a measure of risk aversion weighted by the level of wealth, R U (w) = wA U (w). Equivalently, R U is the elasticity of the agent's marginal utility, U (w). The concepts of monotone relative risk aversion (IRRA/DRRA/CRRA) are defined by the monotonicity of R U (w) in w.
Insights from Special Utility Classes
We investigate the effect of the agent's degree of absolute and relative risk aversion on optimal effort, for some relevant parametric utility classes. Assuming compensation consists of a non-zero salary F > 0, plus variable pay on sales, r(s) = F + v(s), the agent's problem is:
CARA Utility. To study the impact of the degree of absolute risk aversion on optimal effort, consider an agent with exponential ( 
Remark 3. The optimal choice of effort for an agent with CRRA utility decreases in his degree of relative risk aversion.
Remarks 2 and 3 imply that the more risk averse the agent is, the less effort he will put into his sales activity. Both results, however, obtain from special parametric utility classes that assume the agent's (absolute, relative) degree of risk aversion is independent of wealth.
One-switch Utility. To verify the robustness of the above results beyond the above models, consider an agent with a one-switch linear-exponential utility function (see Bell, 1988) 
1+βρe −βw increasing in ρ, i.e. agents with higher ρ are more risk averse at any given wealth level w. In sharp contrast with the results of Remarks 2 and 3, we show that, with one-switch preferences, more risk averse agents actually work harder.
13 As wealth increases the agent with one-switch utility can reverse his preference between two alternatives only once.
Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-00924-2005 Remark 4. For agents with linear-exponential utility U (w) = w − ρe −βw , at any given wealth level the optimal effort is larger at higher levels of ρ, i.e. for higher absolute risk aversion.
Motivating Preference Structures
So far we have considered parametric classes of utility functions that insure a monotone (albeit not consistent) relationship between risk aversion and effort. We next investigate the robustness of such a relationship under general utility functions. Contrary to previous results in the literature, we show that lower risk aversion does not necessarily induce the agent to exert more effort, and we identify the appropriate conditions to achieve that.
Consider two sales agents 1 and 2, with utility functions U 1 (w) and U 2 (w), and denote the corresponding optimal effort levels by x * 1 , x * 2 , respectively. Let Ω(r) be the space of all reward values achievable with the contract r and any positive sales, i.e. Ω(r) = r ([0, ∞) From Lemma 1, the agent with higher marginal return from effort works harder, i.e. x * 2 ≥ x * 1 . Higher effort corresponds to higher rewards, i.e. more wealth. Hence, agents with higher marginal value for wealth are motivated to work harder. Indeed, the condition of Theorem 1 can be restated as U 2 (w +h)−U 2 (w) ≥ U 1 (w +h)− U 1 (w) for all w and all h > 0. The second part of the result shows that higher marginal utility is also a necessary condition for an agent to work harder, regardless of the sales response. Hence motivational dominance among preferences is naturally and robustly characterized by higher marginal utility.
A direct consequence of Theorem 1 is that a risk averse agent with utility U works harder than a risk neutral agent, provided that U (x) − x is increasing, i.e. marginal utility exceeds unity. In general, consider the transformation g, that maps one agent's utility into the other's,
Theorem 1 states that x * 2 ≥ x * 1 whenever g ≥ 1. This does not imply, nor is it implied by convexity of g (which defines U 2 being less risk averse than U 1 ), explaining why the degree of risk aversion has no robust, systematic impact on effort. The following example illustrates a non-monotone relationship between risk aversion and effort. Example 1. Consider three sales agents with utility functions U 0 (w) = β +w, U 1 (w) = ln(β +w), Our results in this section focused on wealth preferences, but extend naturally for effort preferences. One can similarly show that agents with lower marginal disutility of effort work harder, and this is also a necessary condition for the result to be robust with respect to the sales response.
This confirms and generalizes the insights of Lal and Srinivasan (1993) , who show that under a linear cost model, k(C) = kC, the agent's optimal effort choice decreases in k for k ≥ 1.
The Impact of Compensation on Agent's Motivation
Given that firms offer performance-based pay to motivate agents, it is important to understand how properties of the compensation plan impact the optimal effort level exerted by the agent. This is investigated in the current section. We identify two systematic, but typically opposed motivational patterns driven by reward structures: the wealth and marginal reward effects. We further characterize properties of agent's preferences under which increasing (or decreasing) the agent's variable, respectively total, compensation is motivating; these are linked to the aggressiveness of the agent's utility function.
Motivating Reward Structures
Fixed salaries, the most common type of compensation, fail to provide motivation for high performance. Indeed, for a risk averse agent, marginal return from effort decreases as fixed salary increases (U (F + h) − U (F ) is decreasing in F for concave U ), leading to decreased effort levels (Lemma 1). We refer to this as the wealth effect.
Proposition 1. The agent's optimal choice of effort is decreasing in the level of his fixed salary.
This suggests that, in order to increase effort, firms should offer the lowest salary acceptable by the agent, and focus on variable compensation schemes to drive motivation. The result is consistent with current efforts by private and governmental organizations to move away from the traditional annual pay raise to performance-based bonuses, as indicated in the introduction.
While salary appears to be a systematic demotivator, we investigate what transformations of the reward plan systematically motivate managers. From Lemma 1, the agent works more under a reward plan, provided that his marginal return from effort is higher. Since effort has a direct impact on sales, the reward plan which ensures higher effort is the one which induces a higher Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-00924-2005 Figure 1 The marginal reward effect: Contract 2 is more motivating than 1 at any level of sales because r 2 ≤ r 1 and r 2 − r 1 is increasing; r 1 (s) = 10 + (0.5s)1 [6,∞) and r 2 (s) = 7 + (0.7s)1 [6, 15] + (0.5s)1 [15,∞] .
marginal value for output. We refer to this as the marginal reward effect. Moreover, this condition is necessary for the result to be robust with respect to the sales response. into r 2 , lies below and is steeper than the identity line, i.e. g(x) ≤ x and g ≥ 1. In particular, Proposition 1 is a special case of the first part of Theorem 2 with g(x) = x − F . An example of such a transformation that also changes the slope of the (piecewise linear) contract is provided in Figure 1 .
The results in this section characterize robust conditions on the shape of the contract that motivate agents to work harder. However, such prescriptions may be difficult to follow in practice, either because they require knowledge of the agent's utility (Proposition 2), or they imply lowering the agent's pay (Propositions 1 and Theorem 2). The latter is in contrast with the "common wisdom" 
Magnitude of Agent's Total Pay
To assess the motivational impact of increasing the magnitude of the agent's total reward, consider:
where λ captures the magnitude of the agent's return. Increasing λ results in a combined wealth and marginal reward effect, which go in opposite directions. From Lemma 1, the agent is motivated by an increase in the magnitude of his total reward, if his marginal return from effort is increasing in λ. The following dual properties of the agent's preferences formalize this effect; terminology is adapted from Liu (2001) .
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Definition 2. An agent with utility function U is aggressive (conservative), if
If U is twice differentiable, aggressiveness is equivalent to R U ≤ 1; conservativeness is captured by the opposite inequality.
Remark 5. Any conservative agent is risk averse. Any risk seeking agent is aggressive.
Aggressiveness means that the agent's marginal utility is inelastic with respect to changes in wealth (relative risk aversion is the elasticity of U ). In this case, we show that the marginal reward effect from a percentage increase in reward dominates the corresponding wealth effect. This suggests that increasing pay works as a motivational tool for aggressive agents. The opposite is true for conservative agents. Moreover, these properties are necessary to obtain a robust effort pattern, regardless of the sales response. conservative as wealth increases. In particular, for our model, this implies that optimal effort is unimodal in the commission rate: it increases as long as the agent is aggressive (relative risk aversion less than 1), and decreases once the agent becomes conservative. Such an example is provided in Figure 2 with exponential utility. Discrete distributions are denoted (p; x) where x is the vector of outcomes and p the corresponding probabilities.
Magnitude of The Variable Pay
Do larger bonuses motivate agents to work harder? We next investigate how a percentage increase in variable (as opposed to total) pay impacts the agent's effort. These results are also contingent on the agent's aggressiveness and conservatism, and driven by the preservation of these properties with respect to shifts in wealth (induced by the fixed salary F ). The following result holds for all types of agents, regardless of risk aversion. Intuitively, a percentage increase in variable pay leads to the same marginal effect but a weaker wealth effect than a same order increase in total reward (previous section). Hence aggressiveness remains sufficient for higher variable pay to act as a motivator. On the other hand, conservativeness is not enough to counter the reward effect, as illustrated by the non-monotone effort behavior in Figure 3 , for one-switch conservative (DARA) utility. IARA strengthens the wealth effect (the agent's utility becomes more concave at higher wealth levels), and in combination with conservativeness insures that increasing variable pay is systematically demotivating.
Factors Affecting The Agent's Output
This section studies the impact of factors which influence the agent's sales response on his optimal effort choice. An increase in the agent's or firm's productivity, as well as changes in the marketplace have an influence on sales, and indirectly on the agent's motivation to exert effort. We identify conditions on the agent's induced preferences for output that lead to a systematic effort behavior with respect to such factors.
Formally, consider an abstract performance factor θ that positively affects the sales response s(x, Y, θ), i.e. s is increasing in θ. The factor θ has an indirect impact on the agent's optimal effort
Certain structural parameters are consistent in motivating agents regardless of their preferences, such as for example the amount of responsibility or workload (e.g. inventory) that the agent is allocated. Given a workload level θ, the agent's effective output is given by min(S(x), θ), and marginal return from output increases in workload, hence the following result:
Proposition 4. The agent's optimal effort increases with the amount of workload he is allo-
cated.
Yet few factors influencing output have such a direct and consistent impact on effort. In general, comparative statics results for x * (θ) are difficult to obtain, because of the compounded marginal effects of the sales response and value function, and the interactions between x and θ. A productivity factor θ is one that increases the marginal impact of effort on sales (i.e. s is supermodular in (x, θ)).
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For such factors, Lemma 1 implies that optimal effort x * (θ) increases with θ for V convex. The opposite, however, is not necessarily true if V is concave, unless e.g. the effect of effort x and θ are additively separable.
Further insights are derived from focusing on separable and multiplicative interactions. We investigate (1) productivity factors that have a multiplicative effect on overall sales, respectively on the controllable sales component (as controlled by the f irm, respectively agent: θ F , θ A ), and (2) factors that influences the uncontrollable market component in a general stochastic way (θ U ). These effects are jointly formalized in the following sales response model:
Productivity Factors
Several factors can enable the agent to generate more sales at a given effort level. Factors controllable by the firm, such as an improvement in brand or technology or an increase in advertising have a positive influence on the overall sales response. The parameter θ F in model (3) captures such "firm productivity" factors.
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Sales are also conditioned by the agent's own productivity, as a result of past experience, familiarity with the sales territory etc. This impact, however, is limited to the component of sales that is effectively under the agent's control. Such "agent productivity"
factors are captured by the parameter θ A in model (3), with Y ≥ 0. As θ A or θ F increase, the agent is able to generate higher sales for any given effort level x.
The agent's aggressiveness/conservatism towards sales (V ) captures the relationship between optimal effort and productivity. The mechanics are analogous to Sections 4.2 and 4.3, with sales preferences V replacing wealth preferences U . The relevant insights can be summarized as follows:
Proposition 5. (a) If an agent exhibits aggressive preferences for sales, then his optimal effort increases in the firm's and his own productivity. (b) If an agent exhibits conservative preferences for sales, then his optimal effort decreases in the firm's productivity. Moreover, if the agent is also increasingly risk averse for sales (V exhibits IARA), then optimal effort also decreases in his productivity.
Both Lal and Srinivasan (1993) and Basu et al. (1985) consider the impact of the agent's productivity on the optimal choice of effort from a principal-agent perspective. Basu et al. (1985) model the agent's productivity as the slope of the deterministic sales response, and his utility with a power function for which R U ≤ 1. They show that, when the uncertainty in sales is given by a
16 Our results hold more generally for s(x, Y, θF ) = θF S(x).
Binomial or Gamma distribution, the agent's optimal choice of effort increases in his productivity. Lal and Srinivasan (1993) reach the same conclusion with an exponential utility function.
Firms may fear that increased productivity would allow agents to get lazier, as sales are easier to achieve. However, if the firm offers rewards that induce aggressive, in particular risk seeking preferences for sales, then the opposite behavior should be expected. We next show how such behavior can be induced through compensation.
Inducing Aggressive (and Risk Seeking) Behavior. With linear contracts r(s) = F + r · s, the value function V inherits the properties of the agent's utility function U . Convex compensation plans, however, can induce risk seeking behavior, even from risk averse agents. For strictly increasing, twice differentiable contracts r, define q(w) = r −1 (w) the amount of sales required for the agent to achieve wealth level w. This is an increasing function, for which we abstractly define the corresponding measures of risk aversion. If the firm offers a contract such that q = U, then the agent exhibits risk neutral preferences for sales. The following conditions are necessary and sufficient to induce risk seeking, respectively aggressive attitudes towards sales.
Proposition 6. (a) The agent exhibits risk seeking preferences for sales (i.e. V is convex) if and only if A q ≥ A U ; in particular r needs to be convex. (b) The agent exhibits aggressive preferences for sales if and only if q /q +
The conditions A U ≤ A q , respectively A U ≤ q /q + A q , are equivalent to q /U , and respectively q /qU being logconcave.
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In particular, to induce aggressive behavior toward sales it is sufficient to offer convex compensation plans r with q /q ≥ A U , i.e. 1/qU logconcave. 
Uncontrollable Market Factors
This section investigates the impact on effort of changing market conditions, which are outside the agent's control, captured by the factor θ = θ U (indexing is omitted henceforth) in (3), i.e.:
In particular, we investigate the impact of exogenous dynamics in market size, price and risk on the effort level expended by the agent. Risk aversion and prudence towards output are identified as the relevant triggers of systematic motivational patterns.
17 A function f is logconcave if log f is concave. 
We show that agents with convex value functions V are motivated by a bigger market size θ, while smaller markets motivate agents with concave value functions. This follows from Lemma 1, by observing that concavity/convexity of V drive the monotonicity of the agent's marginal return from effort with respect to θ. Furthermore, these properties are necessary to robustly characterize the motivational impact of an increase in market size.
Theorem 4. If the agent exhibits risk averse (risk seeking) preferences for output, then his optimal choice of effort decreases (increases) with market size. Conversely, if an agent decreases (increases) his effort level in response to any first order increase in market size, then V is concave (convex).
An alternative perspective on this result emerges from interpreting market price as the driving factor of both market size and effort. Let
where p is the product's market price, and f (x), g(p) are increasing deterministic functions. S(x, p) is stochastically decreasing in p under first order stochastic dominance. Theorem 4 implies that agents with concave value functions V exert more effort, the higher the market price, whereas convex value functions reverse this behavior. Interestingly, while demand for normal goods decreases in price, this effect is countered by the additional impact of price on effort, and the latter's impact on sales. At the extreme, if demand is not very price elastic, and the agent has significant control over sales, sales can theoretically increase in price, as shown by the following example (proved in the Appendix). 
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In other words, Y(θ 2 ) is riskier than Y(θ 1 ) in the (mean preserving spread) sense of Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970, 1971) . As θ increases, sales are more variable at a given effort level x. An example is S(θ, x) = x + θY, with E[Y] = 0 and θ ≥ 0.
We find that the agent's motivation from changes in market risk is triggered by his prudence, formally defined by Kimball (1990) . A prudent agent increases his precautionary savings in anticipation of future risk. An equivalent, insightful characterization of prudence in terms of risk apportionment is provided by Eckhoudt and Schlesinger (2005) . Intuitively, a prudent agent prefers to disaggregate a sure loss from a zero-mean risk.
Definition 3. An agent with utility function U is said to be prudent (imprudent) if his marginal
It is generally assumed that individuals exhibit prudent behavior. Most common forms of utility functions, like exponential, logarithmic, power or Bell's one-switch utilities, exhibit prudence. Note the difference between prudence and risk aversion. Prudence refers to the propensity of the decision maker to prepare and forearm himself in the face of uncertainty, whereas risk aversion measures how much the decision maker dislikes uncertainty and would turn away from it if possible. In particular, the following relationships hold:
Remark 7. All DARA agents are prudent. All imprudent agents exhibit IARA.
In Kimball's context of precautionary savings (see also Gollier and Eeckhoudt, 2005) , an agent is prudent if an increase in future risk raises marginal value of wealth. Because higher marginal return is motivating in our setting, the prudent agent will expend more effort in response to an increase in market risk. Moreover, prudence/imprudence are necessary conditions for such behavior to be robust with respect to the sales function.
Theorem 5. If the agent has prudent (imprudent) preferences for sales, then his optimal choice of effort increases (decreases) with the variability in the market. Conversely, if for all increasing sales functions s, the agent's optimal choice of effort is increasing (decreasing) in the market variability, then he is prudent (imprudent).
Interestingly, our results are in contrast with insights previously obtained by Lal and Srinivasan (1993) and Basu et al. (1985) who work with prudent utility functions in a principal-agent setting.
In their models, however, a change in market variability leads to a change in the agent's optimal contract, which, in turn, affects the agent's effort behavior.
Inducing Prudence (and IARA). From Theorem 5, agents are motivated by an increasingly uncertain environment whenever the firm offers compensation plans which induce a prudent attitude towards output. The following measure of the degree of prudence was recently proposed as a direct analogue of the degree of absolute risk aversion,
(see Modica and Scarsini, Article submitted to Management Science; manuscript no. MS-00924-2005 2005).
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The next result shows how a firm can preserve or reverse the agent's prudent preferences for wealth into preferences for output. Imprudence towards output can be induced by offering a compensation plan which preserves the risk averse attitude of the agent towards money, but with the inverse reward q = r −1
being "more prudent" than the (prudent) utility U . By offering a compensation plan r(s) = − ln(1 − s), the agent's induced value function is prudent,
Proposition 7 gives only sufficient conditions for compensation plans to induce prudent/imprudent preferences for sales. In special cases, other methods to induce prudence are conceivable, as illustrated in the following example:
Example 5. The compensation plan r(s) = e s induces prudence from an agent with utility
The Agent's Dynamic Problem
In the following, we extend the single period model of Section 2 to a dynamic setting. The agent chooses in each period how much effort to exert, by trading off an immediate effort cost with the utility of variable compensation. The latter is administered at the end of the sales horizon, contingent on cumulative output. The multiperiod model allows to obtain motivational patterns with respect to two factors underlying the agent's intertemporal value function, namely, past performance, and time to evaluation. We show that agents with concave value functions are demotivated by past successes, and longer sales horizons. These predictions are reversed for agents with convex value functions.
Let s t denote the agent's accumulated output up to time t, calculated recursively as s t+1 = s t + S(x t ), t = 1, ..., N − 1. Sales are assumed to be i.i.d. over time; all results easily extend for Markovian sales processes.
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For given accumulated sales s t at time t, the agent chooses the optimal effort level x t according to the Bellman equation:
19 An alternative, widely accepted measure is PU =
. 20 In this case St(x, y) = s(x, Y(y)), where y is the previous period realization of Y. Preservation of risk preferences in a dynamic setting, particularly risk aversion, is a nontrivial result. In contrast, other properties such as prudence, aggressiveness or monotone risk aversion are not robust in a dynamic setting (they are not preserved through the maximization operator, see Smith and McCardle, 2002) .
Past Performance and Time-to-Evaluation. The agent's cumulative output at any point in time, as well the time remaining until evaluation, impact his optimal choice of effort, but in opposite ways. For agents with risk averse preferences we show that better output makes them lazy. Specifically, the better their achieved performance at any given point in time, the less effort they will undertake, ceteris paribus. On the other hand, getting closer to evaluation time acts as a motivator (these agents procrastinate). The closer the agent is from bonus time, the more effort he undertakes, given a certain output level. Agents with risk seeking sales preferences exhibit the opposite behavior: they are motivated by higher output levels and longer horizons. The behavior prescribed by this result is commonly observed in practice. Lal and Srinivasan (1993) mention that "it is not unusual to hear about sales people spending time playing golf or indulging in other activities if their past efforts have been unusually successful". The opposite behavior is rational if firms offer convex compensation plans which induce risk seeking attitude (see Proposition 6). Figure 4 illustrates the insights of Theorem 6 over a four-period horizon (T = 4).
Conclusion
This paper characterized the motivational drivers and patterns of a risk averse agent who chooses an optimal level of effort to trade-off performance-based payoff with disutility of effort. Our approach is different from the bulk of the compensation literature, which focuses on a principal-agent framework. In this context, the agent's contract is assumed to change (optimally for the firm) with
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respect to factors affecting his decision. Such an approach obscures the direct impact of given compensation structures on effort, particularly on the short run when contracts are usually fixed.
In order to isolate this effect, we focused on the agent's problem in response to fixed contracts. We obtained comparative statics that quantify managers' rational behavior under very general forms of output, reward and utility functions.
The insights that we obtained are robust, and surprisingly, different from those obtained under principal-agent frameworks. We identified what properties of the agent's utility function and the reward plan impact effort. In contrast with previous results, we showed that less risk averse agents do not necessarily work harder, but those with higher marginal value of wealth do. We also showed that higher rewards do not necessarily motivate, and actually demotivate so-called conservative agents. Firms who expect to use changes in compensation as a lever to motivate managers should employ an aggressive workforce.
In the second part of the paper, we showed how factors that impact output act as indirect drivers of managers' effort. These results typically require additional conditions on the agent's value function for output (the utility of compensation); interestingly, the conditions that we identify are in contrast with results in the salesforce agency literature. For example, we found that the agent's and firm's productivity are motivating factors for agents with induced aggressive (and in particular risk seeking) attitude. These agents are also motivated by larger market sizes. On the other hand, agents with prudent attitudes towards output are motivated by increased market risk.
In a dynamic setting, we showed that the agent's induced risk preferences for output are preserved over time, through the iterations of the dynamic program. This enabled us to trace the agent's motivation in response to past performance, and time to evaluation, back to his risk preferences for output. Our results are summarized in Table 1 .
In particular, our results highlight the importance for firms to identify and elicit various properties of employees' preferences such as prudence, aggressiveness and risk aversion, in order to understand motivational patterns. This opens up new directions for empirical investigation. It would be interesting to investigate how these motivational patterns may change when accounting for judgmental biases in the agent's decision making process, such as prospect theory valuations.
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We only prove one part of a proposition when the second part is analogous. For simplicity of exposition, the proofs assume differentiability of the functions involved. However, all the results can be extended, using finite differences, to allow for non-differentiability of r, and consequently V . S(x) ). The first part follows because S(x) is stochastically increasing in x, so an increasing function thereof (π) will also be stochastically increasing.
Conversely, assume by contradiction that there exist s 1 < s 2 such that π(s 1 ) > π(s 2 ). Consider the increasing sales function S(x) ≡ s 1 for x < x 0 and S(x) ≡ s 2 otherwise. Hence the firm's profit is Π(x) = π(s 1 ) for x < x 0 and Π(x) = π(s 2 ) for x ≥ x 0 . This is not stochastically increasing in x, a contradiction.
Proof of Remarks 2, 3 and 4. It is equivalent to prove the results for the agent with utility functioñ
s(x, y) andṽ(s) in x and s, respectively, implies in each caseR xρ (x, ρ) ≥ 0, as detailed below. From Lemma 1, this shows that x * (ρ) is increasing in ρ.
(b) Because U conservative implies U concave (Remark 5), for h ≥ 0 we can write,
where the first inequality follows from IARA and the second from R U ≥ 1.
Proof of Proposition 3. Follows from Remark 6 and Theorem 3.
Proof of Proposition 4. From Lemma 1, it is sufficient to show that R(θ,
increasing in z. Because S(x 2 ) F SD S(x 1 ), for all x 2 ≥ x 1 , E [∆(S(x 2 ))] ≥ E [∆(S(x 1 ))] , which is equivalent to the supermodularity of R(θ, x).
Proof of Proposition 5. The results for the firm's, respectively the agent's productivity follow the same lines of proof as Theorem 3, respectively Proposition 3, with V replacing U .
Proof of Proposition 6. (a) Letting w = r(s), we obtain:
U (w) = V (q(w))q (w) 2 + V (q(w))q (w).
From (7) and (8), we obtain:
Because U is increasing, V is convex iff A U ≤ A q . In particular, if log q /U is concave, then A U ≤ A q .
(b) Letting r(s) = w, from (7) and (8), we obtain,
This is less than unity if A U ≤ q /q + A q . In particular, R V ≤ 1 if r is convex (q is concave, so A q ≥ 0) and A U ≤ q /q. Note, A U ≤ q /q + A q is equivalent to (log q /qU ) ≤ 0, i.e. q /qU logconcave. Furthermore, 
(b) Letting w = r(s), we obtain, V (q(w))q (w) 3 + 3V (q(w))q (w)q (w) + V (q(w))q (w) = U (w).
From (7), (8) and (11), we can write:
From A U ≥ A q , D U ≤ D q , and A q ≥ 0 (by convexity of r), we obtain V (s) ≤ 0.
Proof of Proposition 8. Monotonicity is trivially preserved by induction. Preservation of convexity is also proved by induction. Convexity of V t+1 implies for any s 1 , s 2 :
which is equivalent to the convexity of W t (s t , x t ). Hence V t (s t ) = max W t (s t , x t ) is convex in s.
Preserving concavity of V t is slightly more involved, as it requires joint concavity of W t . For any s i , x i , i = 1, 2, we have:
where the first inequality follows by concavity of V t+1 , the second from concavity of s(x, y) in x, and the third from the convexity of C(x). Taking expectations, with x 1 , x 2 denoting the optimal decisions at time t at sales level s 1 , s 2 , we obtain:
Proof of Theorem 6. We first prove the results with respect to past performance. Let s 2 ≥ s 1 , and define ∆(z) = V t+1 (s 2 + z) − V t+1 (s 1 + z), which is decreasing from the concavity of V t+1 (s). Because S(x 2 ) F SD S(x 1 ), for all x 2 ≥ x 1 , E [∆(S(x 1 ))] ≥ E [∆(S(x 2 ))] . This implies submodularity of W t (s, x) = E[V t+1 (s t + S(x t ))] − C(x t ) in (s, x) . Hence x * t (s) is decreasing in s. 22 To simplify notation, we denote x λ = λx1 + (1 − λ)x2 for any x1, x2 and any scalar λ.
